THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Because the exceptions to the general rule that the federal courts will follow the
state court's interpretation of state statutes are not yet crystallized, it is not surprising
to find the lower federal courts differing as to the mode of handling Uniform Laws.
One view is that inasmuch as the Uniform Laws do make certain substantial changes
in the pre-existing law, the construction adopted by the state tribunal should prevail.
Savings Bank v. NationalBank, 3 F. (2d) 970 (C.C.A. 4 th 1925); cf. NiagaraFireIns.
Co. v. Raleigh HardwareCo., 62 F. (2d) 705 (C.C.A. 4 th 1933). But the fact that Uniform Laws in the main merely codify pre-existing law has led one federal court to
adopt an independent construction of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Jockmus v.
Claussen &_Knight, Inc., 47 F. (2d) 766 (D.C.S.D.Fla. 193o). The present case aligns
itself with that decision.
Since the main purpose of the Uniform Laws is to create uniformity between
jurisdictions, it would seem that the desire for uniformity in the federal courts which
led to the evolution of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, would also lead to the application
of that doctrine to the construction of Uniform Laws. But in view of the insecure
foundation of the rule of Swift v. Tyson, there is much to be said for restricting it
wherever possible. See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 81-88 (1923). Moreover, at least one court has
interpreted "uniformity" in the Uniform Laws to mean uniformity between state and
federal courts in a particular state. Savings Bank of Richmond v. NationalBank, 3 F.
(2d) 970 (C.C.A. 4 th 1925); cf. Fordham, Federal Courts and the Construction of
Uniform State Laws, 7 N.C.L.Rev. 423, 429-430 (1929).

Finally, it may be doubted

whether independent construction of Uniform Laws by the federal courts will actually
lead to uniformity within the federal judicial system, in view of the recent stringent
limitations on appeal as of right to the Supreme Court. Judicial Code §§ 239, 240 as
amended [43 Stat. 938 (1925), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 346, 347 (1928)]. This is indicated by the
conflicting decisions of federal courts as to the proper mode of construing Uniform
Laws, a point first raised almost a decade ago.
KARL~ HYBER

Insurance, Public Liability-Concealment-Extent of Duty of Disclosure-[Federal].
-Defendant's application for public liability insurance on his automobile was made to
a broker on October 16, 193o, and was sent by him to the Netherlands Insurance Company, who forwarded it to plaintiff insurance company. Plaintiff received the application on October 21, and on that same day issued the policy dated, in compliance with
defendant's request, to take effect on October 18. On October 19, defendant negligently collided with another automobile. He notified the broker that afternoon, and the
broker informed the Netherlands Company the next morning. Plaintiff did not receive
the information from the Netherlands Company until one day after the policy was
issued and brought this action to rescind. Held, decree for plaintiff affirmed. Strangio
v. ConsolidatedIndemnity and Insurance Co., 66 F. (2d) 330 (C.C.A. 9th 1933).
Two conflicting rules have been applied in those branches of insurance in which the
issue of concealment has been adjudicated. Either there is (i) an absolute duty to disclose all facts which might reasonably influence the insurer in granting insurance, or (2)
the insured's only obligation is to act bona fide. Vance, Insurance (2d ed. 1930), 34 4ff.
The absolute duty is consistently applied only in marine insurance. Sun Muttal
Insurance Co. v. Ocean Insurance Co., 107 U.S. 485, 27 L. Ed. 337 (1882); Burritt v.
SaratogaCounty Mutual FireInsurance Co., 5 Hill 188 (N.Y. 1843); Clinchfield Fuel Co.

RECENT CASES
v. Aetna Insurance Co., 121 S.C. 305, 114 S.E. 543 (X922). In life insurance, the insured's absolute duty is confined to information received after he has applied but before the insurer accepts. Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 72 L. Ed.
895 (1927); Forresterv. Southland Life Insurance Co., 42 S.W. (2d) 127 (Texas ig3i).
Even here, in Armand v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 235 N.Y.S. 726 (1929), the court
only required good faith. The insured need only act in good faith as to facts known at
the time the application is made. Penn.Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics'Savings Bank,
72 Fed. 413, i9 C.C.A. 286 (1896). The rule of good faith is applied to fire insurance
both as to information known before the application was made and that discovered
later. Springfield Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 51 F. (2d) 714
(i3i);

Davis Scofield Co. v. Agricidtural Ins. Co., io9 Conn. 673, 145 At. 38

(1929);

Great American Ins. Co. of New York v. Clayton, 247 Ky. 612, 57 S.W. (2d) 467 (1932).
It is applied in fidelity insurance. Magee et al. v. ManhattanLife Ins. Co., 92 U.S. 93,
23 L. Ed. 699 (1875); StarIns. Co. v. Carey, 126 Kan. 205, 267 Pac. 990 (1928). There
is no duty to disclose information discovered after the contract of insurance has been
consummated, Pendergastv. Globe and Rutgers FireIts. Co., 246 N.Y. 396, 159 N.E.
183 (1927). Where the insured has failed to fulfil the duty of disclosure, the insurer
may rescind, Fales v. New York Life Ins. Co., 128 Cal. App. 201, 17 P. (2d) 174 (1932).
The Civil Code of California states, "A concealment, whether intentional or unintentional, entities the injured party to rescind a contract of insurance," Cal. Civ. Code
(193)

§ 2562.

The reason given for absolute duty in the marine insurance is that here the relevant
facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the insured and the undervriter must
necessarily rely on him for information, Carter v. Boehm, 3 Burrow 19o6 (766). In
life insurance, facts acquired after the application is made are also said to be peculiarly
within the insured's knowledge. But as to facts known before the application is made
it is suggested that the insured is justified in assuming all material information has been
covered by the comprehensive questions asked and hence need only act bona fide,
Stipcicl v. MetropolitanLife Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 72 L. Ed. 895 (1927). In fire insurance, the company may readily determine the character of the risk and should be sufficientiy protected by the obligation to act in good faith. But in fidelity insurance, only
good faith is required, and yet the relevant facts are more apt to be within the insured's
peculiar knowledge, and it is doubtful if the insured can justifiably believe that the insurer has acquired all necessary information. Only one case previous to the present has
come up in which the insured's duty in public liability insurance was involved, Royal
Indemnity Co. v. May and Ball, 222 Ky. 157, 300 S.W. 347 (1927), and there absolute

duty was imposed. Since public liability is more analogous to marine insurance than
to other types with respect to the peculiar knowledge of the insured and lack of justifiable grounds for believing that the insurer has been able to anticipate all relevant information, it is probable that this case and the principal one will be followed and an
absolute duty of disclosure of material facts applied.
But even if there is an absolute duty of disclosure of known facts, there is the further
problem of what acts will satisfy that duty. In marine insurance, if the insured has
made a reasonable effort to communicate the information in due time, he is not barred
from recovery by his failure to get the information to the company before the policy is
issued. M'Lanahan v. Universal Insurance Co., i Pet. (U.S.) 170, 7 L. Ed. 98 (1828); .
Green v. Merchants' Insurance Co., io Pick. 402 (Mass. 183o); Snow v. Mercantile Mu-
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tual Ins. Co., 61 N.Y. i6o (1874); Pendergastv. Globe and Ritgers Ins. Co., 246 N.Y.
396, 159 N.E. 183 (1927). Reasonable effort in due time suffices in life insurance,
Stipcichv. MetropolitanLifeIns. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 72 L. Ed. 895 (1927), and it has been
indicated that if there is an absolute duty in fire insurance that duty is satisfied by the
insured using reasonable means to transmit the information in due time, Springfield
Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 51 F. (2d) 714 (C.C.A. 8th 1931).
Whether a reasonable effort has been made is at law a question of fact for the jury,
M'Lanahan v. Universal Insurance Co., i Pet. (U.S.) r70, 7 L. Ed. 98 (1828); Green v.
Merchants' InsuranceCo., io Pick. 402 (Mass. 1830), but it is said that the use of means

ordinarily employed is required, Proudfoot v. Montefiore, L.R. 2 Q.B. 5:r (1867), but
suffices when used, Snow v. Mercantile MutualInsurance Co., 61 N.Y. 16o (1874). It is
not dear whether the court in the present case meant to require more than a reasonable
effort to get the information to the insurer in due time, or adhered to that rule and
found the defendant's conduct unreasonable in that he sent the information to his
broker and not to the insurer, or limited the rule to apply only when the information is
sent directly to the insurer or his agent. It would seem, however, that the effort of the
broker to transmit the information to the plaintiff through the Netherlands company
should have been considered.
SAMUEL EISENBERG

International Law-Extradition-Necessity of Criminality in the Asylum State[Federal].-The petitioner was held for extradition from Illinois to England upon a
charge of having received money knowing it to have been fraudulently obtained. The
act alleged was not a crime in Illiiois. The article of the extradition treaty (WebsterAshburton Treaty of 1842, 8 Stat. 572, supplemented by the Blaine-Pauncefote Convention of 1889, 26 Stat. i5o8) covering this offense did not specifically require that
it be criminal in both states, although such was the requirement in articles covering
other crimes. Held, that the writ of habeas corpus be denied, the treaty not requiring
that the offense be a crime in both states. Factor v. Laubenheiiner, 54 Sup. Ct. 191, 78
L. Ed. 15I (1933). Butler, Brandeis, and Roberts JJ. dissenting.
The right to demand extradition and the duty to surrender depend on treaty rather
than international law. United States v. Rauscher, i1g U.S. 407, 7 Sup. Ct. 234, 30
L. Ed. 425 (1886); 1 Phillimore, International Law ( 3 d ed. 1879), 517; Pomeroy, Inter-

national Law (Woolsey's ed. i886), 236. But the principles of international law often
throw light upon the intent of the treaty framers and determine to a great extent the
construction to be given the extradition treaty. Thus it was held in United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 7 Sup. Ct. 234, 30 L. Ed. 425 (1886), though there was no

relevant provision in the pertinent treaty, that a person could not be tried for an
offense other than the one for which he was extradited, in accordance with the principle of international law to that effect. i Moore, Extradition (1891) 218; Lawrence,
The Extradition Treaty, 14 Alb. L. Jour. 85 (1876). It is a principle of international
law that there will be no extradition for political offenses. x Phillimore, International
Law (3 d ed. 1879), 521; i Moore, Extradition (18gi), 303. Hence it has been held that
though the applicable treaty does not prohibit such extradition, it will nevertheless be
denied. In re Ezeta, 62 Fed. 972 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1894).
Of particular significance in the present case is the "accepted principle that the acts
for which extradition is demanded must constitute an offense according to the laws
of both countries." r Moore, International Law (1891), 112-113; Byron and Chalmers,

